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Abstract 
The economic behaviors manifested between professors and students may be viewed as a game, with both behaviors 
endogenously correlated. In this paper, a static game is applied to address this behavior and determine the Nash 
equilibrium. Both professors and students choose their best strategies (i.e., optimal efforts) to maximize their payoffs. 
Consequently, theoretical analysis suggests that professor's evaluation and student's grade are endogenously correlated. 
More importantly, an innovation is offered here that is useful in constructing empirical models for the further 
investigation of this issue.
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Since both professors and students are economic individuals, their responses to each other 
manifest as economic behavior. For example, students need good grades from professors and
professors  need  good  evaluations  from  students. These types  of  economic  behaviors  are 
endogenously correlated. Taken further, the economic behavior between professors and students 
may be viewed as a game.
A number of studies have theoretically and empirically examined the relationship between 
student  evaluations  of  teaching  and  students’ grades.  Most of these  studies  have  been  done 
empirically (e.g., Voeks and French, 1960; Kelly, 1972; Nichols and Soper, 1972; Soper, 1973; 
Mirus, 1973; Tuckman, 1975; Danielsen and White, 1976; Dilts, 1980; Marlin and Niss, 1980; 
Seiver, 1983; Nelson and Lynch, 1984; Aigner and Thum, 1986; Mason, Steagall, and Fabritius, 
1995; Krautmann and Sander, 1997; Becker and Watts, 1999; Grimes, Millea, and Woodruff, 
2004; Isely and Singh, 2005; McPherson, 2006). Many have concluded that students’ reported 
grade expectations are positively and significantly associated with students’ overall evaluations 
of teachers. The theoretical framework for this subject has not been significant (e.g., Kelly, 1975; 
McKenzie,  1975;  Lichty,  Vose  and  Peterson,  1978;  Needham,  1978).  The  theoretical  work
started by Kelly (1975) and McKenzie (1975) viewed students as a utility maximizer and focused 
on the potential influences of grades and grading structures on student evaluations of teachers. In 
1978, Lichty, Vose and Peterson extended the theoretical work of Kelly (1975a) and McKenzie 
(1975)  and  examined  McKenzie’s  hypothesis (1975)  that  many  instructors  might  attempt  to 
inflate students’ grades in order to maintain or enhance the evaluations of their teaching.
Although a fair number of previous researchers have investigated and discussed this issue, I
attempt to adopt an alternative approach here by applying game theory to address the economic 
behavior that occurs between professors and students and determine the Nash equilibrium. Thus, 
this  paper  extends  the  literature  on  student  evaluations  used  in  higher  education.  More 
importantly,  it  offers  an  interesting  innovation  that will  be  useful  in  constructing  empirical 
models for further investigation of this issue. These are this paper’s primary contributions.
This paper is organized as follows. First, a theoretical model is developed. Second, a static 
game is applied to address the economic behavior between professors and students, and the Nash 
equilibrium is determined. Concluding comments may be found in the final section.  
II. The Theoretical Model
Suppose a student (say, student j) wishes to produce an education product (e.g., knowledge of 
economics). However, without a professor, student j cannot produce the education product 
independently. Thus, student j enrolls in professor i’s class so that student j and professor i can 
produce the education product (Y ij ) jointly and simultaneously. Professor i now has n students in 
a class (j = 1…n), and produces n different education products with n different students at the 
same time, which isY Y Y i ij in 1  . Therefore, the production function (Y ij ) of the education good 
consists of the following eight factors:
(1) Professor i’s efforts devoted to teaching the class (denoted as Ei). The efforts include 
those that occur  inside and outside the classroom.  For  example, professor i needs to 
prepare the course, grade student j’s exam & homework assignments, and provides office 
hours to help the student manage term projects, homework assignments, and/or exams.2
Note that if the professor has a high expectation standard  for his or her students, the 
professor will devote more efforts to teaching the class and give more lectures. 
(2) Professor i’s human capital (denoted asHi) at the time when he or she teaches the class. 
The professor’s human capital reflects the professor’s quality, which may be identified by 
the  professor’s  highest  education  degree  (e.g.,  Ph.D.  in  economics)  and  teaching 
experiences. Note that professor i’s effective labor is    H E i i  , where  Hi= professor i’s 
human capital at the time that he/she teaches student j, and  Ei= professor i’s effort. 
(3) Student j’s efforts devoted to studying and learning (denoted as ej). The efforts include 
those that occur inside and outside the classroom. For example, the student spends time 
studying for this class at home or in the library. 
(4) Student j’s human capital (denoted as hj ) at the time when he or she takes the class. The 
student’s human capital implies the student’s quality, which can be identified through his 
or  her  SAT  or  ACT  scores,  high-school  GPA,  and  cumulative  GPA  to  date  at  the 
university. For example, economics classes (micro and macro) require high school math 
skills. A student who did very well in high school math will probably have an easier time 
studying economics. Note that student j’s effective labor is  h e j j  , where hj = student j’s 
human capital at the time when he/she enrolls in professor j’s class,  ej = student j’s 
effort.
(5) Teaching/learning environment and supplemental resources (denoted as A). This factor 
identifies the quality of the classroom (e.g., air conditioning, chalkboard, lights, high-tech 
technology, overhead projectors, and chairs) and teaching assistants. For example, many 
professors  in research institutes have  teaching  assistants (i.e., Ph.D. students) to  help 
them with teaching. The responsibilities of a teaching assistant are to grade students’ 
homework  assignments/exams,  give  students  a  review  class  weekly,  and  hold  office 
hours. Such assistance will substantially improve students’ learning and studying, and 
thus increase education output. 
(6) Professor i’s  teaching  attitude  (denoted  asi ).  This  factor  identifies  the  professor’s 
courtesy and respect in class. A good teaching attitude will enhance students’ willingness 
to learn  because professors who  treat students the  same way they  wish to  be treated 
themselves increase education output. 
(7) Professor  i’s  communication  skill  (denoted  asi).  This  factor  indicates  whether  the 
professor’s speech is clear, understandable, and interesting. A clear, understandable, and 
interesting speech will stimulate students’ interest in learning. Seiver (1983) showed that 
this factor is helpful in students’ learning, implying that it will improve education output. 
(8) Student j’s interest in the class (j ). This factor identifies the student’s willingness to 
learn. For example, if the student is interested in the class, he or she will be willing to 
learn and attend the class all the time or very often and study for the class regularly.
Based on these eight factors, it is assumed that the output function of education product,Y ij ,
may be displayed as the Cobb-Douglas form, which is:
    Y B h e H E ij ij j j i i 
 
,                                                                                (1)                                                                 
where B A ij i i j    ; and 0 1     , , and     1 (so that the first-order conditions can be 
sufficient for a maximum effect). In all,   and   are constant parameters and shares of the 3
student j’s effective labor (i.e.,  h e j j  ) and the professor i’s effective labor (i.e.,  H E i i  ) in this 
output function, respectively. The reason  for displaying the output function of the education 
product in the Cobb-Douglas form is that the education product (Y ij ) is created by both professor 
i and student j jointly and simultaneously. If either professor i or student j makes zero efforts 
(i.e.,  Ei  0 or  ei  0), the education output will be zero. Since the Cobb-Douglas form can 
satisfy the assumption, it is the most appropriate form for displaying the output function of the
education  product.  The  other  forms,  such  as  the  CES  and  linear  forms,  cannot  satisfy  the 
assumption. Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas form was chosen for this study.     
In addition, professor i has a cost of teaching the class (CP i , ), which can be illustrated as 
follows:
C c E P i P i i , ,   ,                                                                                               (2)                                                                               
where cP i , > 0 is professor i’s marginal cost of effort (i.e., opportunity cost per unit effort devoted 
to teaching). Note that if professor i has more research requirements and/or other activities, such 
as services or consulting, the professor’s  marginal cost of effort (cP i , ) will  increase. This is 
because the professor’s maximum feasible efforts are fixed. Thus, the fact of a greater number of 
research  requirements  and  other  activities  implies a higher  opportunity  cost  per  unit  effort 
devoted to teaching. Meanwhile, student j also has a cost of taking and studying for the class 
(CS j , ), which can be written as follows:
C c e S j S j j , ,   ,                                                                                               (3)                                                                     
where  cS j , > 0 is student j’s marginal cost of effort (i.e., opportunity cost per unit effort devoted 
to learning and studying). Note that if student j’s working hours increase and/or professor i raises 
the grading standard and expectation, the student’s marginal cost of effort (cS j , ) will increase.
This is because the student’s maximum feasible efforts are also fixed. Thus, more working hours 
and higher grading standards and expectations imply a higher opportunity cost per unit effort 
devoted to learning and studying. 
As a result, professor i has payoff ( P i , ) from producingY ij with student j, which represents
student j’s overall evaluation of professor i, which can be specified as follows:
    
 
P i ij j j i i P i i B h e H E c E , ,   .                                                                (4)                                     
Similarly, student j also has payoff (S j , ) from producingY ij with professor i, which represents
student j’s final grade as given by professor i. This can be specified as follows:
    
 
S j ij j j i i S j j B h e H E c e , ,    .                                                                (5)                                        
It  should  be  pointed  out that the  payoffs  for  professors  and  students  are  not  necessarily 
monetary.  They  also  can  include  a  person’s  achievement  and/or well-being  (i.e.,  utility).  A 
professor who receives good evaluations from students will feel that he or she is a successful 
teacher. The achievement and/or well-being indirectly represent the professor’s payoff. The same 
can be applied to the student’s payoff. In addition, when specifying professor i’s and student j’s 
payoff functions, the education outputs are the same for both professor i and student j – only 
costs differ. This is because the education output (Y ij ), shown in Equation (1), is produced by 
both professor i and student j jointly and simultaneously. In other words, Y ij is an output between 4
professor i and student j, not between professor i and other students, although professor i will 
produce n different outputs (Y Y Y i ij in 1  ) with different n students at the same time in one class.    
III. The Nash Equilibrium
Since  professors  and  students  are  economic  individuals,  the  economic  behavior  between 
professors and students can be viewed as a game. Thus, game theory is applied in this study. 
Both  professor i  and  student j will  play  the  game  and  choose their  best  strategies (i.e.,  the 
player’s best response to the strategies specified by the other player) to receive their best payoffs.
Professor i  needs a  good  evaluation  from  student j,  which  represents professor  i’s  payoff. 
Similarly, student j needs a good grade from professor i, which represents student j’s payoff.
Student j fills out the evaluation before he/she knows his/her final grade. Certainly, professor i
gives student j a final grade before he/she knows the result of student j’s evaluation of his/her 
teaching. Both players (professor i and student j) simultaneously choose actions. Therefore, this 
game may be viewed as a static game of complete information (i.e., a simultaneous-move game). 
In the game, both players (professor i and student j) choose their best strategies (i.e., their 
efforts,  Ei  and  ej).  The  strategies  available  to  each  player  are  their  different  efforts.  It  is 
assumed that effort is continuously divisible. Naturally, negative efforts are not feasible. Hence, 
each player’s strategy space can be represented as    Si i  0,  and    S j j  0, , where  i  and 
 j are the maximum number of feasible efforts for professor i and student j, respectively. Thus, 
in the model, the efforts pair  E e i j
* * ,  is a Nash equilibrium if, for the professor, ej
*solves:    
      max , max ,
* *
, 0 0      
E P i j i E ij j j i i P i i
i i
e E B h e H E c E 
 
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Similarly, for the student, Ei
*solves:
      max , max ,
* *
, 0 0      
e S j j i e ij j j i i S j j
j j
e E B h e H E c e 
 
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If the efforts pair  E e i j
* * , is to be a Nash equilibrium, the players’ effort choices must satisfy 
both equations (6) and (7). Therefore, solving this pair of equations (6) and (7) yields
1:
                                               
1 Substituting equation (7) into equation (6) yields equation (8). And then substituting equation (8) into equation (7) 
yields equation (9). 5
 
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and
 


























1 1 1 1 1 1
1
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.                                                   (9)                                
The  efforts  pair  E e i j
* * ,   is  the  Nash  equilibrium. As  shown  in  equations  (8)  and  (9),
  E B i ij
*  0,   E h i j
*  0,    E H i i
*  0,   E c i S j
*
,  0,    E c i P i
*
,  0,    e B j ij
*  0, 
  e h j j
*  0,   e H j i
*  0,    e c j S j
*
,  0, and    e c j P i
*
,  0. Substituting equations (8) and (9) 
into equations (4) and (5) yields   P i ,
*  and  S j ,
* , which are professor i’s and student j’s payoffs, 
respectively. Therefore:
           
        
P i i j i j i P i S j A h H c c ,
*
, ,  
    
1
1 1 ,                                 (10)                            
and 
          
        
S j i j i j i P i S j A h H c c ,
*
, ,  
    
1
1 1 .                                  (11)                             
Note  that 0 1     ,   and    1,  so  ( )  
   
 1 0  and  ( )  
   
 1 0.  Therefore, 
 P i ,
*  0 and  S j ,
*  0. The effects of exogenous variables (i.e.,i, j ,  i , A, hj , Hi, cP i , , and 
cS j , ) on P i ,
* and S j ,
* can be illustrated as follows:
1.   P i i ,
  0 and    S j j ,
  0. A professor’s communication skill is very important
because  a  clearer  and  more  understandable  speech  pattern  will  enable  students  to 
understand  the  class  material  more  easily  and  help  them  to  do  better  in  the  subject. 
Students who do well will be happier to give the professor a better evaluation. Seiver 
(1983) showed empirically that communication skill and students’ overall evaluation of 
teachers are positively and significantly correlated. This is one reason for the slightly 
lower student evaluations of non-native English-speaking professors – their accent may 
make  them  more  difficult  to  understand.  If  students  find  it  difficult  to  follow  the 
professor’s lectures due to his/her accent and become frustrated, they may express those 
feelings via the evaluation. 
2.   P i j ,
  0 and    S j j ,
  0. A student who is interested in the class will be more
willing to learn and hence will give his/her professors a better evaluation. Such a student
is more serious about and will study harder for the class. As long as the student is serious 
and  does  well,  he/she  will  be  more  confident  about  the  class  and  satisfied  with  the 
professor’s  teaching.  Ultimately,  he/she  will  give  the  professor  a  better  evaluation. 
Certainly, the student will also receive a good grade from the professor.
3.   P i i ,
  0 and   S j i ,
  0. If the professor treats his/her students in the same way 
he/she wishes to be treated, the professor will receive more respect and better evaluations 
from students, because students will appreciate the professor’s respect and courtesy. Of 
course,  the  professor  who  treats  students  respectfully  will  also  be  more  generous  in
giving students better grades.6
4.   P i A ,
  0  and    S j A ,
  0.  A  better  teaching-learning  environment  and 
supplemental resources improve both the student evaluation of teaching and the student’s 
grade.  For  example,  if  the  professor  has  a  very  responsible  teaching  assistant  who 
substantially helps the student, the student will do a good job on the midterm exam and 
receive a good grade. This student will be more satisfied with and interested in the class, 
and thus will give the professor a better evaluation at the end of the semester.
5.   P i j h ,
  0  and   S j j h ,
  0.  A  student  who  has  a  better  quality  educational 
experience will receive a better grade from the professor and offer a better evaluation of
the professor. The quality will stem from the understandability of the professor’s lecture, 
which will enable the student to do better in class. Students who easily understand the 
professor will be more confident in the class and give the professor a better evaluation.
6.   P i i H ,
  0 and   S j i H ,
  0. A professor who is very knowledgeable and has plenty 
of teaching experience will benefit students, who will subsequently do well in the class. 
Students then will be satisfied and give the professor a better evaluation.
7.   P i P i c , ,
  0 and   S j P i c , ,
  0. If a professor’s marginal cost of efforts is higher due 
to greater research requirements or service work, both the professor and the student will 
receive lower payoffs. For example, if the professor is extremely busy with work other 
than teaching,  he/she  may  cancel the  class  and/or office  hours  often  because  his/her 
opportunity costs of teaching this class are very expensive, which may lead him/her to 
reduce efforts on teaching. This will lead students to learn less and become frustrated
with the professor because they do not understand the class and thus cannot do well in it. 
The result will be a bad evaluation.
8.   P i S j c , ,
  0 and   S j S j c , ,
  0. If a student’s marginal cost of efforts is higher due to 
more working hours or higher grading standards and expectations  from the professor, 
both the professor and the student will receive lower payoffs. For example, if the student 
is working 40 or more hours a week while enrolled as a full-time student, the student may 
skip the class quite often and never study/review after class because his/her opportunity 
costs of taking the class are expensive, which may cause him/her to reduce class-related 
efforts. Hence, the student will not understand the professor in class and will not do well. 
The result may be frustration and a poor evaluation. In addition, if the professor raises 
grading standards and expectations, the student may not receive a good grade. Thus, the 
student will have to devote more efforts to studying and may not necessarily receive a 
good grade, resulting in a worse evaluation of the professor. This is why many professors 
elect  to  improve  their  evaluations  by  grading  more  liberally.  As  shown  by  prior 
researchers, including Seiver (1983), Krautmann and Sander (1999), Lichty, Vose, and 
Peterson (1978), Nelson and Lynch (1984), Kelly (1972), McKenzie (1975), and Mirus 
(1973).           
One may argue that the explanations for the partial derivatives (shown above) appear a bit 
simplistic in interpretation because students have varying learning styles and thus may behave in 
varying ways to the same stimulus. I agree with the argument and acknowledge that an empirical
investigation  is warranted.  However, the  main objective of this  study was to  provide a  new 
approach to the further, empirical investigation of this issue. 
IV. Conclusion7
In this paper, I applied a static game to address the economic behavior that occurs between 
professors  and  students.  Both  professors  and  students  choose their  best  strategies (i.e.,  their 
optimal efforts) to maximize their payoffs. The  theoretical analysis  suggests that professor’s 
evaluation and student’s grade are endogenously correlated. More  importantly, an  innovative 
method was  offered  here  that  may  be  useful  in  constructing  empirical  models  for  further 
investigations of this issue.
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